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1 Introduction
Tax administration reforms have been central on the policy agenda of many countries (both
developing and developed) around the world, and they have become much more prominent since
the crisis as countries struggle to restore public deﬁcits.1 Unsurprisingly, part of the focus of these
reforms has been the modernization of the tax administration governance and organizational
structures. This resonates very strongly with the view that supports more ﬂexibility in the
management of budget and human resources, through well-identiﬁed objectives (including the
appropriate design of tax enforcement) and performance standards appropriately supported by
the required resources and incentivization mechanisms, including performance rewards. It is this
issue that this paper aims to address by developing and exploring a model of a revenue authority,
taxpayer and a tax inspector(s) within the setting of a very general form of compensation chosen
by the tax authority. The framework builds on the strand of the literature that views compliance
as an illegitimate activity in which taxpayers are required by tax law to submit a preliminary
report to the tax authority that conveys information regarding their true income, and allows for
a very general reward scheme, comprising a ﬁxed wage and, in particular, a possibly non-linear
compensation on non-compliance detected.2 There are, clearly, a number of reward schemes,
here the focus is on those based on non-compliance detected.
The key aspect of the generality that the analysis seeks is the remuneration function of a tax
inspector required to exert unobservable eﬀort into tax auditing when declared income is private
information of the taxpayers, a focus which also reﬂects its practical importance in the current
policy discussions. It should be stressed too that there is another element that can justify
the link between tax collections and tax inspectors’ remuneration: broadly, it can counter the
incentive to collude between the tax payer and tax inspector. And eliminate it completely if the
foregone reward of the tax inspector, in the event he colludes with the taxpayer and does not
report the discovered tax evasion, is higher than the penalty the taxpayer must pay. In this case,
there is no room for collusion between the two. We return to this in Section 4, where conditions
are identiﬁed on the structure of the reward that makes it collusion-proof.
To anticipate the results that follow what emerges is that the optimal reward scheme is increasing
and, in general, non-linear in the magnitude of discovered non-compliance. The slope and
curvature of the optimal reward depend on the slope and curvature, respectively, of the inverse
of the (familiar) likelihood ratio (the percentage increase in the probability of a successful audit),
which captures how costly it is for the authority to incentivize the inspector.3 The implication
of this is that the power of incentives (the slope of the reward function) is higher (lower) the
lower (higher) is the slope of the inverse of the likelihood ratio, whereas the slope of the optimal
reward function is increasing (constant or decreasing) if the slope of the inverse of the likelihood
ratio is decreasing (constant or increasing). In the equilibrium being characterized, taxpayers
with greater true income under report less than those with lower true income, tax inspectors’
auditing eﬀorts decrease with reported income and the tax inspectors’ remuneration is increasing
in detected non-compliance. The analysis also highlights the role of multiple tax inspectors
who have been allocated diﬀerent tasks in assessing non-compliance. In a world of multiple tax
1There are substantial sums involved behind tax non-compliance. See, for example, Cabral, Kotsogiannis and
Myles (2014).
2Such performance rewards in tax administrations, as a tool in motivating the tax personnel, are not uncommon
with over three quarters of tax administration bodies ‘. . . hav[ing] some ﬂexibility to reward good performance,’
p.148, OECD (2013).
3The analysis here abstracts from other schemes that reward performance (such as promotions). For a com-
prehensive survey of alternative performance reward schemes see Konrad (2008). This is an issue that is left to
future research.
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inspectors, what emerges is that the design of optimal reward structure critically depends on the
strategic relationship of eﬀorts of the team members: when eﬀorts are strategic complements a
new force arises in favor of a reward the slope of which is increasing in detected non-compliance,
while under strategic substitutability the force is in favor of a reward the slope of which is
decreasing in detected non-compliance.
There have been, of course, studies of non-compliance which have investigated a plethora of
policy-related issues.4 Almost all, however, deal with evasion by taxpayers, under the assump-
tion that tax collectors either do not play any active role in tax collection (see, for instance,
Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Yitzhaki (1974) and Reinganum and Wilde (1985, 1986)), or
they themselves maybe intrinsically dishonest and, therefore, prone to collusive behaviour with
the dishonest taxpayers (as in, for example, Besley and McLaren (1993), Chander and Wilde
(1998), Mookherjee and Png (1995) and Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo (1999)).5
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the model, which takes the tax inspectors
to be the instrument of auditing policy, whereas Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. Section
4 then constructs an equilibrium and identiﬁes suﬃcient conditions for its existence. Section
5 extends the analysis to the case of a team of tax inspectors and analyzes the shape of their
reward. Finally, Section 6 summarizes.
2 The model
To formalize ideas, use is made of the framework of Reinganum and Wilde (1986) appropriately
modiﬁed to incorporate the incentives of a tax inspector: it so encompasses both adverse selection
and moral hazard. The model features three players: a taxpayer, the revenue authority and (until
Section 5) a tax inspector.6 Events unfold in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the taxpayer and
the tax authority move simultaneously. In particular, the taxpayer privately observes his true
income and chooses how much income to report to the revenue authority (or, equivalently, and
the way it will be expressed throughout, he chooses the level of tax evasion). In doing so, he
has Nash conjectures regarding the remuneration scheme oﬀered by the tax authority to the tax
inspector.7 The revenue authority, taking as given the income report of the taxpayer, commits
to a remuneration scheme for the tax inspector that is a function of discovered tax evasion. In
the second stage, the tax inspector, who knows the remuneration scheme, always assesses the
4For a survey of the issues see, for instance, Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998), Slemrod and Yitzhaki
(2002) and Hashimzade, Myles and Tran-Nam (2012).
5The model analyzed also shares elements with the literature that focuses on the design of incentive schemes
under both moral hazard and adverse selection, (see, for example, Picard (1987) and Guesnerie, Picard and
Rey (1989)). But the analytics here are developed within a set up that is distinctively diﬀerent from the one
employed in that literature. In a standard moral hazard problem, the distribution of output is exogenously
given conditional on the agent’s unobservable eﬀort. If the distribution of output satisﬁes the so-called monotone
likelihood ratio property, then higher output is used by the principal as evidence of higher eﬀort. As a result,
the agent’s compensation increases with output. In the present set up, the tax inspector’s reward depends on
tax evasion, which is not exogenous conditional on the inspector’s eﬀort, but rather it is chosen by the taxpayer.
This, as will be seen, besides the analytical interest, introduces an important link between tax non-compliance
and enforcement which has been, rather surprisingly, neglected in the fairly sizeable tax evasion, theoretical and
empirical, literature.
6The perspective taken here is that the government delegates the responsibility of auditing to the tax inspector
because it is too expensive for it to perform the auditing function by itself and that the revenue authority has the
expertise needed to perform the tasks required.
7The taxpayer is required to ﬁle a report to the tax oﬃce and all tax reports are audited. It is the intensity of
auditing and, therefore, its success that is a choice variable. There are, of course, additional measures that can
be used to detect non-compliance (such as data matching from diﬀerent sources and third-party reporting). Here
the focus is on audits made by qualiﬁed tax auditors.
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correctness of the tax declaration of the taxpayer and he must decide how much (unobservable)
eﬀort, denoted by e, to exert in verifying the taxpayer’s true income.8
The eﬀort of the inspector determines the probability of successful detection of tax evasion—
best thought of as the product of the probability of an audit (assumed to be equal to one)
and the probability of detection conditional on audit—with higher eﬀort increasing the proba-
bility that the true income will be veriﬁed (and so evasion will be detected) and is given by9
Prob(success|e) = p(e), with p(0) = 0 and p(·) increasing, concave and three times continuously
diﬀerentiable. The cost of eﬀort to the tax inspector is given by an increasing, strictly convex
and three times continuously diﬀerentiable function c(e).
The true income of the taxpayer, denoted I, is distributed continuously with distribution function
F (I) on support [I, I ], where I < I < ∞. The objective of the taxpayer is to maximize after
tax income. The taxpayer who has veriﬁed income x pays tax equal to tx. If tax evasion is
discovered, the taxpayer pays a penalty proportional to the amount underreported, πt(I − x);
the penalty rate, π, is ﬁxed outside the model. The total amount the taxpayer pays in this case
is tI + πt(I − x). The remuneration scheme consists of a base salary w plus a reward b(I − x),
the latter of which is a function of discovered non-compliant income y = I − x. To focus on
the shape of the reward b(I − x), it will be taken, without loss of generality, that w has been
already chosen (as it is often the case) by an outside agency. The variable under the control of
the revenue authority is the reward function b(I −x), which is the main focus of this analysis.10
The tax inspector’s total compensation when non-compliance I−x is discovered is w+ b(I−x).
All players are risk neutral maximizing expected net income (taxpayer and tax inspector) and
expected net tax revenues (revenue authority).11 The taxpayer who has true income I maximizes
UT = p(e(x))[I − tI − πt(I − x)] + (1 − p(e(x)))(I − tx), (1)
choosing how much income x to report to the revenue authority. The analysis focuses on a
separating equilibrium which has the property that the reporting policy of the taxpayer x = r(I),
where r : [I, I] → (−∞,∞), is strictly monotonic in income and therefore invertible and thus
I = r−1(x).12 All players are rational and have consistent beliefs (regarding the true income of
the taxpayer upon observing a report x)13 denoted by τ(x), so upon observing an income report
x they infer the taxpayer’s income, τ(x) = I = r−1(x). With reporting x the taxpayer of income
I = r−1(x) engages in tax non-compliance equal to y(x) = r−1(x)− x.
8Naturally, one can also think of this in terms of the tax inspector deciding on the intensity of tax inspection.
Also the audit is ﬁnal and conclusive.
9Success here is taken to mean that the inspector has gathered suﬃcient evidence to prove that the taxpayer
has concealed taxable income. Reinganum and Wilde (1986) assume that the taxpayer is investigated with a
probability and, if it is investigated, success is certain. Their formulation is equivalent to ours, putting the moral
hazard issue aside, when one focuses on the probability of successful detection of tax evasion, which is what
matters for the taxpayer when he decides how much income to conceal.
10As it will become evident later on, the inspector obtains rents, so its expected utility is strictly positive
even when w = 0. This implies that the inspector’s participation constraint is satisﬁed (assuming a zero outside
option). It is also assumed that a limited liability constraint must be satisﬁed so that w ≥ 0 and b(I − x) ≥ 0.
Also neither the tax schedule nor the penalty is in the control of the revenue authority or the tax inspector. Both
the revenue authority and the tax inspector take these structures are given.
11This is not an unrealistic (and it is a fairly standard in the literature) assumption. See, for example, Rein-
ganum and Wilde (1986) and Cre´mer, Marchand and Pestieau (1990).
12A pooling equilibrium, where all types of taxpayers evade the same amount, and the inspector’s reward is
constant, does not exist, when a separating equilibrium exists.
13A formal deﬁnition of the equilibrium is given in Section 3.
3
2.1 Tax inspector
The tax inspector observes the reward function b(y(x)) and income report x and maximizes
expected utility given by14
UIn = p(e)b(y(x)) − c(e), (2)
choosing the amount of eﬀort, e, to exert on auditing. The necessary condition (a prime denotes
diﬀerentiation with respect to a single variable) of this maximization problem is given by
p′(e)b(y(x)) − c′(e) = 0, (3)
which implicitly deﬁnes15
e(x) = z−1(b(y(x))), (4)
where z(e) ≡ c′(e)/p′(e). Two things thus directly matter for the level of eﬀort exerted by the
tax inspector:
• z(e)—which following the properties of p(·) and c(·), is monotonically increasing in ef-
fort16—and
• the level of the reward b(y(x)).
Interestingly, the slope of the reward (the power of incentives) does not directly aﬀect the level
of eﬀort. Where the slope of the reward, given by b′(y(x)), matters is in determining—through
the choice of income reporting x made by the taxpayer—the change in the probability of success
(though changes in the level of eﬀort). To see this notice that, after denoting f(·) ≡ z−1(·),
e′(x) = f ′(b)b′(y)y′(x). (5)
2.2 Additional preliminaries
Denoting, for easy of exposition, the probability of detection, following from equation (4), as
p(x) ≡ p(e(x)) = p(f(b(y(x)))), (6)
then
p′(x) = p′(e(x))e′(x) = p′(e(x))f ′(b)b′(y)y′(x). (7)
Equation (7) reﬂects the underlying, and intricate, mechanism of the framework which shapes
the equilibrium characterized in Section 3: the success probability of auditing is determined by
three components, income reporting x (which determines the degree of non-compliance y(x)),
the reward schedule b(y) (determined by the extent of detected non-compliance y), and the
response (in terms of eﬀort) of the tax inspector to the reward e(b).
Notice, for later use, that, following from diﬀerentiating equation (7), the curvature of p(x) is
given by
p′′(x) = p′′(e(x))
(
e′(x)
)2
+ p′(e(x))e′′(x), (8)
where e′(x) is given by (5) and
e′′(x) = f ′′ (b) (b′(y)(y′(x)))2 + f ′(b)b′′(y)(y′(x))2 + f ′(b)b′(y)y′′(x). (9)
14The ﬁxed compensation w has been set, for simplicity, to zero.
15It can be readily shown that, at an interior solution, the second order condition is satisﬁed. It can be also
easily veriﬁed that the presence of moral hazard on the part of the tax inspector induces ineﬃciency in the level
of eﬀort being exerted and so the audit probability.
16This follows from the fact that z′(e) = (c′′(e)p′(e)− c′(e)p′′(e)) /(p′(e))2 > 0 where the inequality follows
from p′(e), c′(e) > 0 and c′′(e) > 0 > p′′(e).
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2.3 Taxpayer
Equipped with the determination of eﬀort e(x), given in (4), and the deﬁnition of the audit
success probability and its property, given in (6) and (7), the taxpayer with income I maximizes
(1) choosing how much income x to report to the tax inspector, with necessary condition
−p′(x)(1 + π)(I − x) + p(x)(1 + π)− 1 = 0, (10)
which deﬁnes reporting policy x = r (I) (which, it has to be emphasized, is independent of the
distribution of income).
Suﬃciency of the maximization problem of the taxpayer implies that
−p′′(x)(I − x) + 2p′(x) < 0, (11)
where, again, p′(x) and p′′(x) are given, respectively, by (7) and (8).
2.4 Revenue authority
The revenue authority, for given income reporting x and upon making use of the fact that
I = r−1(x) and y(x) = r−1(x) − x, maximizes expected revenue. Making use of (6), expected
tax revenue is thus
R = p (f(b(y(x))))
[
tr−1(x) + tπy(x)− b(y(x))] + (1− p(f(b(y(x))))tx. (12)
Since income reported x is taken as given, and so is y(x), (12) is maximized pointwise with
respect to b giving
p′(b)t(1 + π)y(x) = p′(b)b+ p(b), (13)
where, for ease of exposition, we denote p′(b) ≡ p′(e)f ′(b) and thus p(b) ≡ p(e(b)).
Equation (13) is the standard optimality condition: at the optimum, the revenue authority sets
b such that the marginal beneﬁt from an additional unit of b (the LHS) equals the marginal
cost (the RHS). When b increases marginally the increase in tax revenue depends on p′(b), the
increase in the probability of a successful audit, through the higher eﬀort exerted by the tax
inspector. But incentivizing the inspector is costly because a marginal increase in b has two
eﬀects on the revenue authority’s cost: when the audit is successful this marginal increase in
b needs to be paid, the p(b) term, and the marginal increase in b increases the probability of
success, suggesting a higher expected cost for all the inframarginal units of b, the p′(b)b term.
A measure of how eﬀective the reward is in motivating the inspector to exert eﬀort is the
percentage increase in the probability of a successful audit following a marginal increase in the
reward, p′(b)/p(b), which is the likelihood ratio.17 It will prove convenient to deﬁne the inverse
of the likelihood ratio ψ(b) ≡ p(b)/p′(b) and express (13) as
t(1 + π)y(x) = b+ ψ(b). (14)
Observe that the LHS of (14) is independent of b. The RHS of (14) is the Marginal Cost of
Incentivizing the Inspector, (‘MCII’) or, equivalently, the sum of the reward and the inverse
17Note the diﬀerences and similarities between the likelihood ratio in this model and the one in standard moral
hazard models. In a standard moral hazard model, f(q|e) is the density of output as a function of the agent’s
eﬀort and the likelihood ratio is fe(q|e)/f(q|e), where fe is the derivative with respect to e. In our three-player
model, the equivalent of output q is the successful detection of tax evasion y. The probability of success is in the
direct control of the inspector, but tax evasion y is not, as it is chosen by the taxpayer. Moreover, the likelihood
ratio in our model is with respect to the reward b and not with respect to eﬀort e, although b aﬀects e.
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of the likelihood ratio (which it will be useful to note that it depends on the shapes of the
probability function p(e) and the cost of eﬀort function c(e)—a point elaborated in Appendix
C). Suﬃciency of the revenue authority’s maximization requires that the MCII is increasing in
b, that is,
1 + ψ′(b) > 0. (15)
What will be of particular interest is the slope and the curvature of the MCII, b+ ψ(b), which,
as will be shown shortly below, shapes the structure of the optimal reward oﬀered to the tax
inspector.
3 Equilibrium definition and main results
This section deﬁnes a separating equilibrium, where the revenue authority and the taxpayer are
making their choices simultaneously anticipating the response of the tax inspector, and then
characterizes the diﬀerential equations that the optimal reward and taxpayer’s evasion must
satisfy in such an equilibrium.
Definition 1 A separating equilibrium is a quadruple {e˜(b(y)), y˜(x), b˜(y), τ˜ (x)}, with r˜−1(x) =
y˜(x) + x strictly monotonic, such that:
i) given income reporting x, beliefs τ˜(x) and reward b(y), the eﬀort e˜(b(y)) maximizes the
inspector’s expected utility,
ii) given eﬀort e˜(b˜(y)) and reward b˜(y), the amount of tax evasion y˜(x) maximizes the
taxpayer’s expected utility,
iii) given beliefs τ˜(x), eﬀort e˜(b(y˜)) and tax evasion y˜(x), reward b˜(y) maximizes the
expected tax revenue, and
iv) beliefs are consistent, τ˜(x) = r˜−1(x) for all x.
Equipped with this deﬁnition, and the discussion in Section 2, we have that:
Proposition 1 Assuming that the revenue authority’s and taxpayer’s second order conditions
are satisﬁed, the inspector’s optimal reward b0(y) and the taxpayer’s tax evasion y0(x) must
satisfy the following diﬀerential equations:
b′(y) =
t(1 + π)
1 + ψ′(b)
> 0, (16)
y′(x) = −
(
1 + ψ′(b(y))
)(
1− p(b(y))(1 + π))
(1 + π)
(
p′(b(y))b(y) + p(b(y))
) , (17)
where ψ(b) ≡ p(b)/p′(b).
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix A. 
Following from (16)—with the strict inequality following (15)—the expression t(1+π)/(1+ψ′(b))
is continuously diﬀerentiable in b on [0,∞). This implies that for any given boundary condition a
unique solution b0(y) exists, at least in the neighborhood of the boundary condition. The solution
itself is continuously diﬀerentiable and thus the right-hand-side of (17) is also continuously
diﬀerentiable in y. A unique solution y0(x) then exists in the neighborhood of the boundary
condition, Birkhoﬀ and Rota (1989).
It also readily follows from Proposition 1—and by routinely diﬀerentiating (16)—that:
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Corollary 1 The slope of the reward function (‘power of incentives’) depends positively on the
tax rate t and the penalty π and negatively on the slope of the MCII 1 + ψ′(b).
There is some simple intuition behind this, following directly from equation (14): for given
tax evasion y(x) an increase in either t or π increases tax revenue, in the event of a successful
audit. As there is now more tax revenues available for collection, the revenue authority needs
to incentivize the tax inspector, with a higher reward b at that given level of y(x), holding the
slope of the MCII, 1 + ψ′(b), ﬁxed. Moreover, as 1 + ψ′(b) increases it becomes more costly to
incentivize the inspector, yielding a ﬂatter optimal reward function.
The question now is how tax evasion is aﬀected by the level of income. It is the case that:
Lemma 1 Under the conditions of Proposition 1, dI/dx = r−1′0 (x) > 0 and y
′
0(x) < 0, that
is, taxpayers with higher true income also report higher income and tax evasion is a decreasing
function of the income report (and the taxpayer’s true income) .
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of Lemma 1 is in Appendix B. 
There is a simple intuition behind the strong result of Lemma 1.18 Fix the structure of the
reward b(y)—which is increasing in the amount of non-compliance detected y(x)—and consider
the interaction between the tax inspector and the taxpayer. Following from (5) and thus the fact
that e′(x) < 0, the tax inspector will exert a lower eﬀort upon having observed a higher income
report, and following from (7) that p′(x) < 0 a taxpayer who reports higher income faces a lower
probability of being found in non-compliance. The taxpayer’s best-response to a lower audit
probability is to report more income when his true income increases. As the taxpayer reports
more income when his true income increases, it is the tax inspector’s best-response to exert
less eﬀort when higher income is being reported. The type of the taxpayer (his true income)
is revealed in a separating equilibrium through the income report—in the sense that the tax
inspector, by observing the taxpayer’s income report, can perfectly infer, in equilibrium, the
true income—but still eﬀort must be exerted in order for this true income to be veriﬁed.
Thus far it has been established that the compensation oﬀered to the tax inspector is increasing
in the detected evaded income and its slope depends on t, π and the slope of the MCII b+ψ(b).
Naturally, the question that arises next is what determines the curvature of the reward function
and so the response of the power of incentives. This is the question that we now turn to.
Lemma 2 The optimal tax inspector’s reward b0(y) is concave, (convex or linear) in y if and
only if ψ(b) is convex (concave or linear) in b that is, if and only if the MCII is convex (concave
or linear) in b.
Proof of Lemma 2. Diﬀerentiate (16) to obtain
b′′0(y) = −
ψ′′(b0)b′0(y)t(1 + π)
(1 + ψ′(b0(y)))2
. (18)
Since, t(1 + π) > 0, and, following from (16), b′0(y) > 0, the curvature of (minus) ψ(b0) (which
is the curvature of the modiﬁed marginal cost reward) determines the curvature of the reward
function. 
18Lemma 1 is reminiscent of the result in Reinganum and Wilde (1986) who show that tax evasion decreases
with income. The introduction of moral hazard does not have a qualitative eﬀect on the taxpayer’s incentives to
evade his tax liabilities as his income increases.
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Interestingly, there is thus a wide range of shapes the optimal reward can take (convex, linear
or concave, where the power of incentives increases, stays constant, or decreases with detected
non-compliance) and that its actual shape (not the level) depends on the shape of the MCII: if
the MCII b+ψ(b) increases at a decreasing (increasing) rate, then the power of incentives should
be increasing (decreasing) in the magnitude of tax evasion. In more practical terms, as noted
earlier, what is important for the actual curvature of the tax inspector’s optimal compensation
scheme are the shapes of the cost of eﬀort c(e) and probability of success p(e).
The next section characterizes the conditions required for Lemma 1 to hold.
4 Characterization of the equilibrium
Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 have shown that in a separating equilibrium b′0(y) > 0, y
′
0(x) < 0
and r−1′0 (x) > 0. The slope of the reward function, b
′
0(y), is positive provided that 1 + ψ
′(b) is
positive, which holds in lieu of the second order condition of the revenue authority’s maximization
problem in (15).
Next, we construct an equilibrium19 by identifying conditions that would guarantee that y′0(x) <
0 and r−1′0 (x) > 0. Since y
′
0(x) = r
−1′
0 (x)− 1, r−1′0 (x) > 0 if and only if y′0(x) > −1.
Using (17), the reward b0(y) must satisfy
(
1 + ψ′(b0)
)(
1− p(b0)(1 + π)
)− p(b0)(1 + π)
p′(b0)(1 + π)
≡ b1 ≤ b0 < b2 ≡ f−1
(
p−1
(
1
1 + π
))
, (19)
where20 b0 < b2 ensures that tax evasion decreases with x, y
′
0(x) < 0 and b0 ≥ b1 ensures that
tax evasion does not decrease too fast, so that there is a strictly monotonic reporting strategy,
r−1′(x) > 0, except possibly at the boundary of the income report.
The Theorem that follows summarizes the characterization of the equilibrium.21
Theorem 1 If b0(y) and y0(x) exist throughout [x, x] and satisfy the second order conditions of
the taxpayer and the tax inspector and (19), then the following quadruple is an equilibrium:
(i.) The equilibrium reporting policy y˜(x) in [x, x] is the unique solution, y0(·), to y′(x) from
(17).
19Following similar steps as in Reinganum and Wilde (1986).
20This follows again from (17) and the fact that y′0(x) < 0 requires 1−p(b(y))(1+π) > 0. This implies—recalling
that p(b(y)) ≡ p(f(b(y)))— that y′0(x) < 0 if b0 < p−1(f−1(1/(1 + π))) ≡ b2.
21The analysis has abstracted from the consideration that the tax inspector might be dishonest and engage in
collusive behaviour with the taxpayer so the latter under-reports the discovered tax evasion in return of a side
payment from the taxpayer (for elements of this see Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo (1999)). Such collusion will be
mutually proﬁtable if and only if b(y) < tπy, that is, if the loss to the inspector in terms of the foregone reward
when he does not report the evasion to the revenue authority is less than the gain of the taxpayer in terms of the
saved tax penalty. A suﬃcient condition for a collusion-proof reward is b′ ≥ tπ, which, together with b(y) > 0,
guarantees that b0(y) ≥ tπy. If π ≤ 1, the above condition is always satisﬁed when the inspector’s reward is
either linear or convex in y. Collusion-proofness can also arise even when the reward is concave in y (details are
available upon request).
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(ii.) The equilibrium reward is given by
b˜(x) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
b0(I − x) for x < x
b0(y0(x)) for x ∈ [x, x]
b0(I − x) for x > x,
where b0(·) is the unique solution to b′(·) from (16).
(iii.) The equilibrium eﬀort is e˜(x) = f(b˜(x)).
(iv.) Finally, the equilibrium beliefs are
τ˜(x) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
I for x < x
y0(x) + x for x ∈ [x, x]
I for x > x.
Proof of Theorem 1 The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix D. 
Figures 1-3 illustrate Theorem 1.22
b˜(y)
y˜(x)
b˜′′(y) = 0
b˜′′(y) < 0
b˜′′(y) > 0
y˜(x) y˜(x)
Figure 1: Equilibrium reward b˜(y) as function of detected noncompliance y(x)
22Notice that the ﬁgures depict the shapes of the relevant functions and not their levels which have been chosen
arbitrarily. Examples underlying the Theorem exist. See the longer version of this paper, Kotsogiannis and Serfes
(2015).
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r˜(I)
I
I I
x
x
Figure 2: Equilibrium income reporting x˜ = r˜(I) as function of true income I
p(e˜(x))
x
x x
1
Figure 3: Equilibrium auditing p(e˜(x)) as function of income reporting x
Beyond its technical content, there is a practical element—related to the tax administration
issues discussed at the outset—behind the result of Theorem 1 (which is independent of as-
sumptions on the distribution of income, the latter of which does not feature in the theorem): in
the presence of moral hazard the auditing strategy requires to be supported by an appropriate
reward schedule that is increasing in the amount of tax evasion discovered.
Perhaps more fundamentally, what lies underneath Theorem 1 is that if a separating equilibrium
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which satisﬁes (19) exists, then a reward that is constant in evaded income does not exist. To
emphasize:
Proposition 2 If the separating equilibrium characterized by Theorem 1 exists, then there does
not exist an equilibrium with constant tax evasion and constant reward.
Proof of Proposition 2 The proof of Proposition 2 is in Appendix E. 
5 Multiple tax inspectors and optimal performance reward
Thus far the analysis has focused on the revenue authority consisting of (and the audit policy
being implemented by) one tax inspector. In practice, tax audit implementation is an outcome
of several tax inspectors who may be allocated certain activities and take joint action in as-
sessing the taxpayer’s behaviour. This joint action can, of course, take many forms possibly
including, the tasks of gathering speciﬁc evidence, processing, evaluating and communicating
information. It is their common interest (detecting non-compliance) through diﬀerent activities
and the individual incentives which raise the natural question (addressed next) of what is the
structure of the performance reward for a team of tax inspectors?
To begin exploring some of the implications of multiple tax inspectors, suppose now that tax
auditing is performed by two tax inspectors, indicated by the subscript i = 1, 2. To further
simplify matters at some point the probability of a success will take the form
p(e1, e2) = e1 + e2 + θe1e2, (20)
and the tax inspectors will be treated symmetrically23 with cost function c (ei) = e
2
i /2, and
performance reward b (y (x)) /2. Conveniently, the parameterization of p(e1, e2) in (20) implies
that (with a subscript denoting the derivative of the function with respect to that variable)
peiei = 0 and peiej = θ, i = 1, 2, i = j, and so the parameter θ in (20) captures whether eﬀorts
are strategic complements (θ > 0) or substitutes (θ < 0).
Clearly, the introduction of a team of tax inspectors leaves the structure of the taxpayer’s
maximization problem (and so Lemma 1) unaﬀected. But it changes the incentives to exert
eﬀort of the tax inspectors, and, therefore, the probability of audit success and consequently the
shape of the tax inspectors’ reward function. To see this, notice that for a given reward function
b(y(x))/2 and the taxpayer’s income report x = r(I), inspector i = 1, 2 maximizes expected
utility given by
UIni = p(e1, e2)
b(y(x))
2
− c(ei), (21)
with necessary and suﬃcient conditions, respectively,
pei (e1, e2)
b (y(x))
2
− c′(ei) = 0, (22)
peieib (y (x))− 2c′′(ei) < 0. (23)
For given reward function b (y (x)), equations (22) can be simultaneously solved for the equilib-
rium eﬀorts ei (b (y (x))), i = 1, 2, and, thus, the probability of successful audit can be written
as p (e1 (b (y (x))) , e2 (b (y (x)))). Denote this by p(b).
23But they neither need be symmetric nor the performance reward of the revenue authority should be of the
egalitarian form.
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Notice also that (22) implicitly deﬁnes the best-response of inspector i ei(ej), for i = 1, 2, i = j,
with
e′i(ej) = −
peiejb (y (x))
peieib (y (x))− 2c′′(ei)
, (24)
and so, following (23), whether eﬀorts are strategic complements (in the sense of e′i(ej) > 0) or
substitutes (in the sense of e′i(ej) < 0) depends on peiei = θ. It is easy to verify that the speciﬁc
functional forms employed for p(e1, e2) and c(ei) imply that e1 = −b (y (x)) / (b (y (x)) θ − 2) =
e2.
Equipped with the above discussion, the revenue authority maximizes (12) with the structure
of the necessary and suﬃcient conditions of this maximization problem being the ones given,
respectively, in (14) and (15). Following from the functional forms employed, what this implies
is that the curvature of the reward function—recalling from the discussion in Lemma 2 that
this is related to the shape of the MCII b + ψ(b) and, in particular, takes the opposite sign of
ψ′′(b)—is given by24
ψ′′(b) =
3θ
4
(
θb (y (x))− 2
)
. (25)
Since, following from (23), b (y (x)) θ − 2 < 0, ψ′′(b) takes the opposite sign of θ. Summarizing:
Lemma 3 Assuming that the success probability takes the form of (20), and the cost of eﬀort
is quadratic in eﬀort, the optimal tax inspectors’ reward b0(y) is concave, (convex) in y if and
only if ψ(b) is convex (concave) in b, which is the case if and only if the tax inspectors’ eﬀort
are strategic substitutes (complements).
Here is, therefore, an example where the fundamental determinant of the shape of the reward
function is the strategic relationship of tax inspectors’ eﬀorts exerted in the allocated tasks: if
they are strategic complements (in the sense of peiej = θ > 0), the MCII b + ψ(b) increases at
a decreasing rate, implying that the power of incentives should be increasing in the magnitude
of tax non-compliance. The opposite holds if they are strategic complements. The intuition is
as follows. When eﬀorts are strategic complements, the eﬀort of one inspector reinforces that
of the other and an increase in the reward is more eﬀective in motivating both inspectors to
exert higher eﬀort, implying that the MCII increases but at a decreasing rate. So, the optimal
reward itself must be increasing at an increasing rate (convex). The reverse is true when eﬀorts
are strategic substitutes, in which case a higher eﬀort on part of one inspector is partly oﬀset
by the eﬀort reduction of the other. In this case, the MCII increases at an increasing rate.
Clearly, if the two inspectors are independent and so θ = 0 (or, as in the case in the previous
sections, there is one tax inspector), then the reward function is increasing linearly in non-
compliance. It needs to be emphasized, however, that in this section even though the cost
function is quadratic and the probability of success linear in own eﬀort the reward function is
not a linear function in non-compliance. What drives the shape of the reward function is not
entirely the cost of eﬀort and the shape of the probability of success with respect to own eﬀort
but, more importantly, the speciﬁc interaction of the eﬀorts exerted by the team members in
the allocated tasks.
6 Summary
This paper has incorporated the incentives of tax inspectors into an equilibrium model of tax
compliance and enforcement and characterized the optimal compensation policy of the revenue
24The details are available upon request.
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authority, the audit policy of the tax inspector and the compliance strategy of the taxpayer,
when true income is private information and the inspector’s eﬀort in verifying an income report
is unobservable to the revenue authority (moral hazard). It has shown that the reward of tax
inspector (a function of detected tax evasion) is, in general, nonlinear and that the power of
incentives (in the sense of the slope of the optimal reward function), can be constant, decreasing,
or increasing in the magnitude of the discovered tax evasion. The other two features of the
equilibrium characterized are consistent with those of Reinganum and Wilde (1986), in the sense
that taxpayers with greater true income under report less than those with lower true income
and tax inspectors’ auditing eﬀorts decrease with reported income: the latter being determined
by the interplay of properties of the cost of eﬀort and probability of success functions.
The paper has also highlighted the role of multiple tax inspectors in assessing non-compliance.
The simple analysis of this paper—with two tax inspectors and analytically convenient functional
forms for the cost of eﬀort functions and probability of audit success—has also pointed to a rich
set of possibilities, driven by the strategic relationship of eﬀorts of the team members regarding
the structure of the optimal reward structure.
Appendices
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. This appendix establishes that the tax inspector’s optimal award
follows (16) and the taxpayer’s tax evasion (17).
Making use of (6) and (7), and of the fact that y(x) = I − x = r−1(x) − x, into (10) and
rearranging gives
(1 + π)y(x) = −
(
1− p(b)(1 + π))
p′(b)b′(y)y′(x)
, (A.1)
which upon substituting (A.1) into (13) gives
b′(y)y′(x) = − t
(
1− p(b)(1 + π))
p′(b)b(y) + p(b)
. (A.2)
Substituting (A.2) into (A.1) gives
y(x) =
1
t(1 + π)
(
b(y(x)) + ψ(b(y(x)))
)
, (A.3)
where ψ(b) ≡ p(b)/p′(b). Since (A.3) holds for any admissible x, diﬀerentiating both sides with
respect to x one obtains
y′(x) =
1
t(1 + π)
(
b′(y(x))y′(x) + ψ′(b(y(x)))b′(y(x))y′(x)
)
. (A.4)
The second order condition given by (11), making use of (8), becomes
A ≡ −
{
p′(e)f ′′ (b) (b′(y)(y′(x)))2 + p′(e)f ′(b)b′′(y)(y′(x))2 + p′(e)f ′(b)b′(y)y′′(x)
+ p′′(e)(f ′(b)b′(y)y′(x))2
}
y(x) + 2p′(e)f ′(b)b′(y)y′(x) < 0. (A.5)
Equation (A.4) points to two cases: (i) y′(x) = 0 and (ii) y′(x) = 0.
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Case (i): If y′(x) = 0, then from (A.2) follows that p(b) = 1/(1 + π), which implies that
b(y) = f−1
(
p−1 (1/(1 + π))
)
= c′
(
p−1(1/(1 + π))
)
/p′
(
p−1(1/(1 + π))
)
(with the second equal-
ity following from the fact that f(·) ≡ z−1(·), where z(·) ≡ c′(·)/p′(·)). Diﬀerentiating (10) with
respect to x, allowing also I to change according to r−1(x) gives25
A− p′(b)b′(y)y′(x)r−1′(x) = 0, (A.6)
where A < 0 is the second order condition of the taxpayer in (A.5). With y′(x) = 0, b′(y)y′(x) =
0, (A.6) is not satisﬁed. Clearly, for the constant reward and veriﬁcation case to be an equi-
librium, the taxpayer must be indiﬀerent among all reports, in which case the second order
condition is satisﬁed with equality. Section 3 examines this case and shows that such an equi-
librium does not exist.
Case (ii): With y′ = 0, then (A.4) is satisﬁed if (omitting the x for ease of exposition)
b′(y) =
t(1 + π)
1 + ψ′(b(y))
, (A.7)
which is (16). Consistency between (A.7) and (A.2) implies that y′(x) takes the form of (17). 
Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 1. Since, following from Proposition 1, b′(y) > 0, and, following from (A.5),
A < 0 then from (A.6) it is the case that
b′(y)y′(x)r−1′(x) < 0. (B.1)
It is thus the case that either (i) b′(y) > 0, y′(x) < 0, and r−1′(x) > 0, or (ii) b′(y) > 0,
y′(x) > 0, and r−1′(x) < 0.
Case (ii) is ruled out since y(x) = I − x = r−1(x) − x and so y′(x) = r−1′(x) − 1 > 0 is
inconsistent with r−1′(x) < 0. It follows that only case (i) holds. 
Appendix C
Derivation of ψ′′(b) and dependence of MCII on p(e) and c(e). Diﬀerentiating ψ(b0)
twice gives
ψ′′(b0) = −p
′′(b0)
p′(b0)
+
2p(b0)(p
′′(b0))2
(p′(b0))3
− p(b0)p
′′′(b0)
(p′(b0))2
, (C.1)
where, recalling that p(b) ≡ p(f(b)), with f(·) ≡ z−1(·), z(·) ≡ c′(·)/p′(·),
p′(b) = p′(e)f ′(b), (C.2)
p′′(b) = p′′(e)f ′(b) + p′(e)f ′′(b), (C.3)
p′′′(b) = p′′′(e)
(
f ′(b)
)2
+ p′′(e)
[
f ′′(b)
(
1 + f ′(b)
)
+ f ′′′(b)
]
, (C.4)
where f ′(b) = 1/(z′(z−1(b))) > 0 and z′(·) = (c′′(·)p′(·)− c′(·)p′′(·))/(p′(·))2.
We turn now to MCII. Since MCII is b + ψ(b), with ψ(b) ≡ p(b)/p′(b) that MCII depends on
p(e) and c(e) follows from (C.2). 
25Notice that to arrive at (A.6), during diﬀerentiation the inspector’s eﬀort e(x) responds to changes in the
type of the taxpayer in the sense that y(x) = r−1(x)− x = I − x, y′(x) = r−1′(x)− 1 and y′′(x) = r−1′′(x).
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Appendix D
Proof of Theorem 1. Let x be the highest reported income associated with the highest true
income I and let y ≡ y(x) ≡ I − x be the amount of tax evasion at the highest true income.
The boundary condition of the ordinary diﬀerential equation (16) is the b that solves, following
from (13),
b = t(1 + π)y − ψ(b). (D.1)
The claim now is that if (19) is satisﬁed the right-hand-side of (D.1) must be strictly positive
that is, t(1 + π)y − ψ(0) > 0 which implies that y > ψ(0)/(t(1 + π)). To see that this is the
case suppose y ≤ ψ(0)/(t(1 + π)). Then, the right-hand-side of (D.1) is nonpositive at b(y¯) = 0
(and for any positive b) and b(y) = 0, since only that value satisﬁes (D.1) (with an inequality
in the case of b(y¯) = 0, assuming that the reward is not allowed to take negative values). But
this boundary would imply zero eﬀort on part of the tax inspector, that is, f(0) = 0 and hence
p(0) = 0. This implies, following from (19), that b1(y) > 0, which in turn implies that b(y) = 0
violates the condition b0 ≥ b1. As it has just been established, t(1 + π)y − ψ(0) > 0 and, it will
be recalled, that ψ′(b) > 0. This implies that there exists a boundary condition for b′, b(y) > 0,
that uniquely satisﬁes equation (D.1).
Next, we choose the boundary for the diﬀerential equation (17). Since y is the lowest tax evasion,
and b′(y) > 0, b(y) is also the lowest. Recall that b0 ≥ b1 must be satisﬁed. We choose as a
boundary the y that solves b1(y) = b0(y). This amounts to solving y
′(b(y)) = −1. If this solution
does not exist, it means that either y′ < −1 or y′ > −1 for all possible boundary conditions. In
the former case, a separating equilibrium does not exist because r−1(x) is decreasing in x. In
the latter case, we solve y′(b(y)) = −k and we choose the y(k) that corresponds to the maximum
k ∈ (0, 1).26 Once the boundary condition y has been chosen, the x is given by y = I − x. The
lower bound x is the solution to y0(x) = I − x. Such an x clearly exists since y0(x) increases as
x decreases with slope less than one (in absolute) and x can approach −∞.
In addition, it is assumed that
b′0
[
t(1 + π)
1 + ψ′(b0)
(I − x)
{
1− ψ
′′(b0)
1 + ψ′(b0)
}
+ 2
]
≥ 0 for x > x
b′0
[
t(1 + π)
1 + ψ′(b0)
(I − x)
{
1− ψ
′′(b0)
1 + ψ′(b0)
}
+ 2
]
≥ 0 for x < x. (D.2)
The above condition always holds if ψ′′(b0) ≤ 0, that is if the reward is either linear or convex.
It may also hold if ψ′′(b0) ≥ 0, and so the reward is concave.
Given the assumptions outlined in text, the solutions to the diﬀerential equations, (16) and (17),
that govern the evolution of the reward and the taxpayer’s reporting respectively, exist and are
unique. Further, we assume that this is true throughout [x, x].
We next show that the taxpayer has no incentive to report an x outside the [x, x] interval. Let
x > x. The belief of the inspector is τ(x) = I. So, y(x) = I − x and y′(x) = −1. The optimal
reward for any x > x is now b0(y), with y = I − x, so b0(I − x). Fix the type of the taxpayer
at I and consider the ﬁrst order condition of the taxpayer given by (10), re-written here for
convenience,
−p′(b)b′(y)y′(x)(1 + π)y(x) + p(b)(1 + π)− 1 = 0. (D.3)
26Of course, this is only one equilibrium among, possibly, a continuum of equilibria, each one corresponding to
a diﬀerent initial condition. Nevertheless, all equilibria share the same qualitative properties.
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At x = x, the ﬁrst order condition is satisﬁed with equality. Diﬀerentiating (D.3) with respect
to x one obtains
−[p′(b)(b′(y))2 + p′(b)b′′(y)]y(x) − 2p′(b)b′(y). (D.4)
The above expression is negative if and only if
[(b′(y))2 + b′′(y)]y(x) + 2b′(y) ≥ 0, (D.5)
which, after using the expressions for b′ and b′′, becomes
b′
[
t(1 + π)
1 + ψ′(b)
y(x)
{
1− ψ
′′(b)
1 + ψ′(b)
}
+ 2
]
≥ 0, (D.6)
which is satisﬁed given (D.2).
Therefore, the slope of the taxpayer’s utility function decreases as x increases beyond x. Given
that the slope is zero at x = x, it follows that it becomes negative when x > x. Thus, the
taxpayer has no incentive to report an income higher than x. While so far we have set I = I,
the same steps can be used to show that even if I < I the taxpayer has no incentive to report
an x higher than x. Suppose I < I. The slope of the taxpayer’s objective function is zero if
he reports x = r(I) < x and the objective function is strictly concave, implying that the slope
of the objective function is negative at x = x. After this point, as we showed above, the slope
becomes even more negative, making a deviation in that region unproﬁtable.
The same steps can be used to prove that any x < x is a dominated strategy, using in this case
b0(I − x) for any x < x. 
Appendix E
Proof of Proposition 2. Following the proof of Proposition 1, y′ = 0 (and so tax evasion is the
same across all taxpayer types), implies b = f−1
(
p−1 (1/(1 + π))
)
. This, however, cannot be an
equilibrium. The reason is as follows. The constant reward gives rise to a constant probability
of detection p(e(b)) = 1/(1+π), which implies that the taxpayer is indiﬀerent among all income
reports x for any I. So, he will choose some constant tax evasion consistent with this equilibrium
(the constant y, denoted by yˆ, can be determined from the ﬁrst order condition of the revenue
authority (13)).
The income reports are in the interval [I− yˆ, I− yˆ]. Note, using (19), that the reward associated
with the constant solution is higher than the reward from the separating equilibrium.
First, assume that yˆ < y˜(x). This implies that I− yˆ > I− y˜(x) = x. Consider now the taxpayer
with I = I who, according to the constant reward equilibrium, should report I − yˆ. Suppose
this taxpayer deviates to x ∈ (x, I − yˆ). The beliefs are τ(x) = I and the optimal reward is now
the b0(y) which is discretely lower than the constant reward. The taxpayer becomes better oﬀ
because tax evasion increased, while the probability of detection decreased. This is true for a
positive measure of taxpayers.
Assume now that yˆ > y˜(x). This implies that I − yˆ < I − y˜(x) = x. Consider now the taxpayer
with I = I who, according to the constant reward equilibrium, should report I − yˆ. Suppose
this taxpayer deviates to x ∈ (I − yˆ, x). The beliefs are τ(x) = I and the optimal reward is
now the b0(y) which is discretely lower than the constant reward. The taxpayer becomes better
oﬀ because tax evasion has decreased marginally, while the probability of detection decreased
discontinuously. This is true for a positive measure of taxpayers.
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Finally, because y˜(x) < y˜(x) the above two cases exhaust all the possibilities. Therefore, the
constant reward cannot be an equilibrium, provided that the separating equilibrium satisﬁes
(19). 
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